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NOTES
WHEN GRANDMA BECOMES MOM: THE
LIBERTY INTERESTS OF KINSHIP FOSTER
PARENTS
Gabrielle A. Paupeck *
INTRODUCTION
A commentator on children's rights made an analogy between the
parent-child relationship and the relationship that develops between
an elephant and a baby bird about to hatch in the beloved Dr. Seuss
book Horton Hatches The Egg.' In this children's story, Horton the
elephant sits on an egg for a mother bird who runs off and leaves her
baby unguarded.2 When she returns, Horton sadly relinquishes his
role as parent and caregiver. However, when the child emerges it
looks like an elephant and not like a bird.3 The crowd observing these
strange events exclaims: "it should be, it should be, it SHOULD be
like that! Because Horton was faithful! He sat and he sat!"'4 Horton's
ties to the baby in the egg were not weakened because he was not the
natural parent. They were strengthened by the passage of time and
the careful attention that Horton gave to the baby.
Charlene Bannon knows all too well about making this kind of
sacrifice.5 In 1998, she moved to San Francisco to study acupuncture.
She struggled with her finances, like most students, but was making
ends meet by using her savings and credit cards. Charlene did not
anticipate that she would soon have two extra mouths to feed and the
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Ann Moynihan for her invaluable assistance with this Note. I would also
like to thank Mom, Dad and Jessica for their constant love and support.
1. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1749-54 (1993), Dr. Seuss, Horton
Hatches The Egg (1940).
2. Woodhouse, supra note 1. at 1750.
3. Id. at 1750-51.
4. Id at 1751 (quoting Dr. Seuss. Horton Hatches The Egg (1940)). "HORTON
STAYED ON THAT NEST!/He held his head high/And he threw out his chest.. J'l
meant what I said/and I said what I meant.... An elephant's faithful/One hundred
percent!'" Id. at 1750 (quoting Dr. Seuss).
5. Steve Christian. Helping Kin Care for Kids. 26 St. Legis., Dec. 2000, at 20,
available at 2000 WL 15407517.
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responsibilities of a primary caregiver. She found no other option but
to take on the role of surrogate mother when she discovered the
"grotesque" conditions in which her niece and nephew were living.6
Aged five and nine, the children suffered from neglect and abuse at
the hands of their drug and alcohol addicted mother, Charlene's sister.
Charlene had to care for the children and accept welfare payments of
$565 a month to cover their expenses. 7
Ann Lester of Passaic, New Jersey is 66 years old.8 She is raising
her twin grandchildren because her son and his girlfriend could not do
so. She works to supplement her Social Security checks and the
monthly welfare stipend she receives for the children. Charlene and
Ann are part of a growing group of Americans who are, under state
auspices, taking in relatives' children in times of need. They are
collectively referred to as kinship caregivers.
The American foster care system provides daily care for children
who lack suitable primary caregivers. 9 The current trend is, and has
been for some time, away from institutional care and toward family
homes."0 This is both less expensive for the state and better for the
child because he or she will receive more individualized attention."
Each day in this country about one half million children live in foster
homes."2 The paradigm that most people typically associate with the
term "foster care" is an unrelated stranger who temporarily opens up
his or her home to a child in need in return for a subsidy from the
state. Not every foster home, however, follows this model.
"Kinship care" has emerged as an increasingly common option. 3
"Kinship care" is a broad umbrella term for a variety of placement
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ovetta Wiggins, Advocates Propose More Help For Givers of 'Kinship Care',
The Record (New Jersey), Oct. 4, 2000, 2000 WL 15834194.
9. In fact, state and federal law require that states provide this service for
children who need it. Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and
the Right to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Party Options in
Permanency Planning, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 835, 835 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994)).
10. This shift is at least partly attributable to the cost of keeping a child in
institutional care. See The Nat'l Ass'n. of Attys. Gen., Legal Issues in Foster Care 3
(1976) (citing a study stating that in Massachusetts it is seven times more expensive to
keep a child in an institutional rather than in a home setting).
11. See id.
12. Mangold, supra note 9, at 835 (citing Staff of House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 105th Cong., 1998 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs
Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 783 (Comm. Print
1998)).
13. Noy Davis & Janet Chiancone, The Kinship Care Option: Applying Research
to Practice, in What I Wish I'd Learned In Law School: Social Science Research For
Children's Lawyers 103 (ABA Ctr. on Children and the Law ed., 1997) [hereinafter
What I Wish I'd Learned in Law School]. But see, Losing Our Children: An
Examination of New York's Foster Care System (1999), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Reports/Chil/199905 (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) (noting
reduction in kinship placements in New York City in the late 1990s).
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options, but generally it involves a child being placed in a relative's
home instead of a stranger foster home.'" It is estimated that more
than two million children in the United States are living with relatives
other than their parents. 5 This situation raises the issue of what rights
the members of these extended family units should have in the family
law and constitutional law arenas. Do these rights equal those of the
stereotypical mom, dad and 2.5 children,b or are they similar to those
of the foster family, which has no constitutional right to family
association,17 or do they fall somewhere between the two? The
answer is significant because, if the relationship is like a stranger
foster family and not a biological family, the state has a greater
interest in the relationship and a greater right to interfere. This
includes the right of the state to remove the child from the home.',
This Note will concentrate on the rights of kinship foster parents.
These foster parents are relatives who receive monthly stipends to
help support the children in their care. 9 Part I will define kinship care
and consider it as an alternative to traditional foster care. Specifically,
this part will examine the rise of kinship foster care in the last twenty
years, its advantages as an alternative to stranger foster care, and
criticisms of kinship care.
Part II will examine the idea of a liberty interest for families
generally, and will discuss the rights of kinship foster families in
particular. This part will place this liberty interest in the context of
the due process clause. It will then consider the court system's
recognition of biological parents' interest in their children and the
14. Davis & Chiancone, supra note 13, at 103.
15. Jodi Nirode, Agencies Lagging in Helping Relatives Care For Their Kin, The
Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 4, 2000, 2000 WL 27863448.
16. Natural parents have a due process interest in their children. Foster parents
may have certain procedural due process rights, but their rights are not equal to those
of natural parents. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether or not
kinship foster parents are entitled the substantive due process rights accorded to
natural parents. See infra part II.
17. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-
46 (1977) ("[I]t is appropriate to ascertain from state law the expectations and
entitlements of the parties. In this case, the limited recognition accorded to the foster
family by the New York statutes and the contracts executed by the foster parents
argue against any but the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the foster family.");
Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to find a liberty
interest in the foster family, but leaving the door open for possibility that kinship
foster families may have this right); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family &
Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that foster families do
not have a liberty interest under the constitutional right to family privacy). A liberty
interest may either arise directly from the Constitution itself or from an expectation
created by the laws of the states. Ky. Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989).
18. See infra notes 169-73.
19. Gerald Wallace, Grandparents Parenting Grandchildren: A New Family
Paradigm, 185 PLI/Crim 195, 205-06 (2000). Although Wallace's article is aimed at
grandparent caregivers, the principles are equally applicable to all relative caregivers.
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shortcomings of this traditional model. These rights will be contrasted
with the limited recognition of foster parents' rights in relation to their
foster children.
Part III will argue that tradition and family should be defined
broadly and that traditional analyses may be inappropriate for the
kinship foster care situation. Finally, this part will find that kinship
foster families have a protectable liberty interest arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It will, however, recognize that this interest
must be evaluated on a fact-specific, case by case basis to discover
whether a particular kinship foster family has a relationship that rises
to the level of, and deserves the same protection as, a "typical"
nuclear family. This Note concludes that kinship foster parents and
their foster children have a right of family association that is protected
by due process.
I. KINSHIP CARE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO "TRADITIONAL"
FOSTER CARE
Traditional foster care provides shelter and support for children in
times of family crises when their biological parents are unable to care
for them. These arrangements are generally intended to be
temporary. ° Often, however, they end up being long term.2' Such
placements may be made voluntarily by the parent through an
agreement that gives the state responsibility for the child's daily care,
and relinquishes part of the parent's decision-making authority.2 2 If
there is neglect or abuse in the family, an involuntary placement can
occur. 3 The traditional model centers on the placement of children
with stranger foster families. However, the foster care system, indeed
the entire child protection system, is overburdened and strapped for
resources. 24  One way in which the system has expanded to
accommodate this problem is to include kin as a foster care option.
As long as there have been human families, relatives have cared for
nieces, nephews, grandchildren and other relatives in times of need.
While the historical origins of such arrangements were probably
informal, two of the three options that have emerged to define these
relationships are formalized procedures.25 First, the relative could
20. Kristin J. Brandon, Comment, The Liberty Interests of Foster Parents and The
Future of Foster Care, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 403, 405 (1994) (citing Cristina Chi-Young
Chou, Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care: Enforcement of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to
Safety, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 683, 683-84 (1993)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 406.
23. Id. at 407.
24. Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for Child Protection, 8 The Future
of Children 104, 107 (1998).
25. Wallace, supra note 19, at 205-06.
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forego a court order and care for the child informally. -' This generally
means that the relative would receive no funding except, perhaps, for
a welfare subsidy.' Second, the relative could seek court-ordered
legal custody or guardianship.' Funding may or may not be granted
in these situations depending on which state or federal laws apply.?
Lastly, the caregiver can take the child in as a kinship foster parent.'3
Kinship foster care is defined as "the placement of a child who is in
the custody of a state child protection agency into a home in which the
caregiver(s) are the child's relative by birth, marriage, or other adults
with whom the child or parent already have a close emotional
attachment."31  Generally, child welfare workers view these familial
placements in a positive light. 2 Many do find, however, that kinship
placements are difficult to supervise.33 Still, in urban areas it appears
that more foster children are placed with relatives than with
strangers.34
26. Id.
27. See id. at 216-17 (quoting N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 349(B)(1)).
28. Id. at 210 (stating that both legal custody and guardianship provide "sufficient
health, educational, and financial authority" though there may be practical
differences between the two).
29. See id. at 216.
30. Id. at 205-06.
31. Elizabeth Killackey, Kinship Foster Care, 26 Fam. L.Q. 211, 211 (1992)
(quoting Ivory L. Johnson, Kinship Care: Issues and Challenges, Paper Presented at
the ABA Fifth National Conference on Children and the Law (Nov. 1-3, 1990))
(discussing both traditional and kinship foster care and proposing a model for kinship
care).
32. Sandra Beeman & Laura Boisen, Child Welfare Professionals' Attitudes
Towards Kinship Foster Care, 78 Child Welfare 315, 315 (1999).
33. Id.
34. In New York City, there was a two hundred percent increase in kinship
placements, as opposed to a twenty-six percent increase in stranger placements,
between 1986 and 1990. Maria Gottlieb Zwas, Note, Kinship Foster Care. A Relatively
Permanent Solution, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 343,354 (1993). More than fifty percent of
all foster children were in kinship foster care in New York City as of December, 1991;
in Philadelphia, it was more than sixty-seven percent as of March, 1992; in Chicago
fifty-seven percent of all new foster care placements in 1989 were into kinship foster
families. Marianna Takas, Kinship Care: Developing a Safe and Effective Framework
for Protective Placement of Children With Relatives, 13 Child. Legal Rts. J. 12, 12
(1992). But see Losing Our Children: An Examination of New York's Foster Care
System, available at, http://assembly.state.ny.us/ReportsChil/199905 (last visited Mar.
15, 2001) (New York State Assembly report). This report shows a decline in kinship
foster placements, finding thirty-three percent of placements in 1997 to be with
kinship foster parents, whereas, as discussed above, the number was more than fifty
percent in 1993. Id. However, the report states that kinship care is -the best solution
for children because they maintain ongoing relationships with their families." Id.; see
also Outcome & Performance Indicators: New York City Administration for
Children's Services 81 (June 1998), available at http'Jlwww.ci.nyc.ny.usihtmllacsfpdf/
rpindrep.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) (charting statistics about foster care in New
York City from 1977-1997, and finding that in 1997 the percentage of children in
kinship care had dropped to thirty-three percent of all placements).
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A. The Rise of Kinship Foster Care
In the 1980s, a huge increase in reports of child abuse and neglect
increased the demand for foster parents.35 Reports of neglect and
abuse rose from four in every one thousand children in 1975, to forty-
seven in every one thousand children in 1994.36 This increase has been
attributed to several factors, including substance abuse, specifically
the rise in crack cocaine abuse during the 1980s. 3 7 Additionally, many
foster children are placed when their family is homeless or has
inadequate housing and, by 1994, almost half of the U.S. homeless
population consisted of families with children."8 The rise in the
number of children in need of placement created a large demand for
suitable foster homes. Simultaneously, nationwide the number of
foster families has decreased and child welfare agencies have
increasingly recognized that relatives are a vital placement resource.39
In Miller v. Youakim,4 the Supreme Court held that relatives were
entitled to receive state payments for acting as foster parents.4' This
eased the burden on relatives who otherwise could not afford to care
for these children.42 Concurrently, views about both governmental
and extended family responsibilities to protect children changed and
services tended to become more family-oriented. 3 In the last twenty
years, new policies and legislation have concentrated on "family
preservation and family ties."'  Caseworkers began paying more
attention to the idea of keeping families together. As a response,
children were increasingly placed with kinship foster parents.45 By
35. Zwas, supra note 34, at 343 (citing Manhattan Borough President's Advisory
Council on Child Welfare, Failed Promises: Child Welfare in New York City 3 (July
1989)). In 1962, the U.S. population between the ages of zero and eighteen was
69,864,000, of which 272,000 were in foster care. By 1994, the population for this age
group had risen by two percent but the population in foster care had risen by seventy-
three percent. Ira M. Schwartz & Gideon Fishman, Kids Raised by the Government
55 (1999).
36. Waldfogel, supra note 24, at 105.
37. See Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg, Child, Family, and State:
Problems and Materials on Children and the Law 525 (4th ed. 2000).
38. Id. at 524-25 (citing Children's Defense Fund, State of America's Children 37.
41(1994)).
39. Jill Deurr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family Care
and Kinship Care, 8 The Future of Children 72, 74 (1998) (stating that the number of
foster homes in the United States was 147,000 in 1987 but shrank to 100,000 by 1990):
Davis & Chiancone, supra note 13, at 103.
40. 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
41. Id. at 145.
42. See Berrick, supra note 39, at 76 (noting that in New York approved kinship
placements receive the full foster care subsidy whereas in Colorado, Illinois and Texas
the full rate is only received when the home is licensed).
43. See id. at 74.
44. Laurel K. Leslie et al., The Heterogeneity of Children and Their Experiences in
Foster Care, 79 Child Welfare 315, 316 (2000). The piece is a study of 484 children in
San Diego County, California. Id. at 315.
45. See Davis & Chiancone, supra note 13.
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1990, one study estimated that thirty-one percent of placements by
child welfare authorities were with kin.4 6
The statutory schemes regarding kinship foster parents vary among
states. Some states require that families receive the same training and
licensing as stranger foster parents receive, while some states have
written a preference for kinship care directly into their statutes. 7
Since all foster parents must become licensed, these kinship foster
parents can be stranger foster parents to other children in need,
helping the foster care system generally.' If the number of children in
foster care continues to rise, these additional resources could be
invaluable to a system that is already strapped for foster parents.
4
B. Benefits of Kinship Foster Care
Kinship foster care also brings many benefits for the child. Sibling
groups are more likely to be kept together if they are placed with
kinship foster parents."0 It is also less traumatic for a foster child to be
placed with relatives than to be placed with strangers."' There is a
tremendous difference to a seven-year old between going home to
grandma, or going home to a stranger, when that child has already
been traumatized by removal from his mother or father.5- Kinship
foster parents, more than stranger foster parents, focus on the
emotional issues of separation and loss a child feels when he or she
enters placement.53 Also, children placed in kinship foster care are
less likely to be shuttled from foster home to foster home, a reality
faced by many children in stranger foster care.'
46. Berrick, supra note 39, at 73.
47. Id. at 76 (stating that all counties in California have lower standards for
kinship foster parents, while in Colorado and Texas kinship caregivers must undergo
the same licensing process as stranger foster parents); see also N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act §
1017(1) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993): In re W. Children. 167 A.D.2d 478 (1990)
(finding it acceptable to place a child with a relative where the parent who neglected
the child lives in the same household).
48. See Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note. A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care
May Be the Key to Stopping the Penduhun of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51 Vand.
L. Rev. 1427, 1451-52 (1998).
49. See Waldfogel. supra note 24. at 107.
50. Leslie et al., supra note 44. at 316-17.
51. Zwas, supra note 34. at 354: Editorial. Blood and Money: Kinship Doesn't
Disqualify Foster Parents From Paynent, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 18. 2000.
2000 WL 22078376.
52. Zwas, supra note 34, at 354 (stating that kinship care avoids -'the difficulty of
establishing rapport with complete strangers").
53. See Leslie et al., supra note 44. at 317.
54. O'Laughlin, supra note 48. at 1451: Berrick, supra note 39. at 81 (stating that
shifting placements may lead to -'disruptive behavior" in children and that when
kinship foster children changed homes it was often to live with another relative and
not a stranger).
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In addition, foster care status can stigmatize a child in the
community, especially among his or her peers.5 Living with relatives
can mitigate this stigma because the child is still living with family and
is not viewed by others as a ward of the state. 6 Kinship care is also
more likely than stranger foster care to result in a healthy self-esteem
and to help maintain the child's identity.57 Studies have shown that
kinship foster children are more likely to consider themselves happy
and loved than children in non-kinship care. 8 In addition, the natural
parent may be more likely to visit in a kinship care setting. 9 As one
commentator notes, "[i]f instituted in the framework of specifically-
tailored, family-sensitive legislative policies, kinship care can promote
family and cultural unity, while reducing trauma to the most
vulnerable children."'6
C. Criticisms of Kinship Foster Care
Some commentators have disputed the assertion that kinship care is
the best alternative for children. Their concern is the effectiveness of
replacing informal extended family caregiver arrangements with
formalized state intervention in the form of kinship foster parent
programs.61 In the past, these informal arrangements generally have
taken place outside the child welfare system. 62 The caregivers often
relied on public assistance where necessary and available. 3
55. Zwas, supra note 34, at 354 (citing Council of Family and Child Caring
Agencies, Kinship Foster Homes and the Potential Role of Kinship Guardianship 3
(Apr. 1991)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Child Welfare League of Am., Nat'l Comm'n on Family Foster
Care, A Blueprint for Fostering Infants, Children and Youth in the 1990's 74 (Mar.
1991)); Christina M. Zawisza & John M. Ratliff, Helping Relatives Raise Kids, S. Fla.
Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 23, 2000, 2000 WL 22204166 ("[K]inship care provides children
with permanence, continuity and connections.").
58. Berrick, supra note 39, at 80 (stating that seventy percent of kinship foster kids
rate themselves as happy or very happy, whereas only fifty-nine percent of stranger
foster children do so, and that ninety-four percent of kinship kids but only eighty-two
percent of non-kinship foster kids always feel loved).
59. Zwas, supra note 34, at 354 (citing Task Force on Permanency Planning for
Foster Children, Inc., Kinship Foster Care: The Double Edged Dilemma 1 (Oct.
1990)). But see Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L. Rev.
423, 468 (1983) (noting that mentally disturbed or "psychologically destructive"
parents should not be allowed visitation, but generally promoting visitation by natural
parents for children in foster care); infra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that
there can be a conflict where a caseworker cannot control whether an abusive parent
has access to the child).
60. Takas, supra note 34, at 17. Minorities represent a disproportionate number
of the children in foster care and more should be done to encourage kinship
placements in these cases in order to help kids preserve their identity and self-
confidence. Schwartz & Fishman, supra note 35, at 136.
61. James P. Gleeson et al., Understanding the Complexity of Practice in Kinship
Foster Care, 76 Child Welfare 801,803 (1997).
62. Id. Mark E. Courtney theorizes that public assistance reform could cause
more families to enter into the foster care system. Mark E. Courtney, The Costs of
[Vol. 70
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Kinship foster parents may not receive the financial support and
services that stranger foster families receive from the government.'
This is due, in part, to a view that relatives should take care of their
own kin and not place additional burdens on the state.- Fewer
services may result in great financial and emotional stress as the
family adapts to having an additional member. This focuses the
debate on the financial aspects of kinship foster care. One
commentator has observed that "[t]he growing cost of kinship foster
care has caused some to reach for simple explanations of the grow-th
of kinship care and simple means of reducing the use of kinship foster
care."6 6 Simply put, the institutionalization of kinship care has cost
the state money in the form of granting foster care subsidies to
relatives who might otherise perform the same function for free.
Child welfare programs cost over $11 billion in federal and state
spending in 1995 alone.67 The financial issue is diminished where a
family does not need a state subsidy and takes the child in under a
guardianship arrangement.' The state's interest would then shift
from financial and protective to simply protective, guarding the child
against neglect and abuse.
Family history may indicate that a particular kinship foster parent is
actually inappropriate due to previous abuse and neglect." Studies
have documented that these problems can be part of a cross-
generational cycle.7" There is definitely a need to determine the risk
of harmful behaviors in kinship foster placements.7 Abuse and
neglect are not the only dangers. Kinship caregivers are often over-
burdened. In one study, seventy-eight percent of kinship caregivers
had between five and twelve residents in their homes and fifty-six
Child Protection in the Context of Welfare Reform, 8 The Future of Children 88, 89
(1998). Concurrently, there will be a fiscal impact because foster care is much more
expensive for the state than public assistance programs. Id.
63. See Courtney, supra note 62, at 89.
64. See Zwas, supra note 34, at 356-57.
65. Courtney, supra note 62, at 99. Courtney notes the irony that if subsidies are
taken from kinship foster parents who then cannot afford to care for their foster
children, the children will just end up in more expensive foster placements. Id.
Additionally, the reluctance to fund such programs is contrary to the societal good of
keeping children with their families.
66. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 804.
67. Courtney, supra note 62, at 88 (noting that this figure includes costs such as
"investigations, casework services, foster care, and adoption assistance").
68. Id. at 89. Courtney notes the financial impact created when children are
moved into foster care because foster care costs more than welfare. It follows that the
state interest is different for the less expensive (or even free) guardianship alternative.
See id.
69. Zwas, supra note 34, at 359.
70. Id.
71. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 803.
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percent had between four and nine children at home under the age of
eighteen.72
It may also be difficult to control whether or not an abusive or
otherwise dangerous parent has unsupervised visits with the child
when the child is placed with a relative.73 The caseworker therefore
loses a certain degree of control over what should be supervised
visitation. Additionally, some kinship foster parents may actually
reject state services and thus go unmonitored.74 This is especially
relevant because agency caseworkers are not as diligent with kinship
foster placements as they are with stranger foster placements. 75
Perhaps this is due to the view that families are inherently more likely
to take better care of related children than they are of children who
are strangers.76
Permanency has become the focus of many child welfare
proceedings. 7  It is defined in prevailing models as either return to
natural parents or adoption.78 While kinship care has been touted as
promoting stability for children,79 children in such placements are less
likely to be reunited with their parents.80 This may be due to
bureaucracy, financial issues and a lack of involvement in services by
kinship foster parents.81 Return to parents has traditionally been a
permanency option. Regarding adoption, one study noted that
kinship foster parents were "reluctant" about adoption.' "The most
common reasons given for their reluctance were general ambivalence
and apprehension about adoption, the hope that the biological parents
would be able to regain custody of the children, an unwillingness to
consider adoption because the child 'was already a blood relative,' and
an unwillingness to replace the biological parents."'
72. Id. at 810. In the same study, seventy percent of the kinship caregivers were
female and they ranged from twenty-five to seventy-two years of age. Id. The median
age was fifty years old. Id.
73. Zwas, supra note 34, at 360.
74. O'Laughlin, supra note 48, at 1452-53.
75. Id. at 1452; see also Berrick, supra note 39, at 78 (charting the disparities in
areas such as income, education and health between kinship and non-kinship
caregivers).
76. See Zwas, supra note 34, at 344.
77. This focus is mainly due to the writings of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and
Albert J. Solnit in Before the Best Interests of the Child (1979) [hereinafter,
Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests], Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(1973), and In the Best Interests of the Child (1986). See also Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
78. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 804.
79. See supra Part I.B.
80. Leslie et al., supra note 44, at 317.
81. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 813.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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The child welfare system, however, is not blind to these problems.
The Child Welfare League of America ("CWLA") recommends
certain standards for kinship foster placements. According to the
CWLA, the following areas should be evaluated:
[r]elationship between child and relative; [albility and desire of
relative to protect the child from the parent; [s]afety and nurturing
environment of home; [w]illingness of family to accept child;
[a]bility of parent to meet child's developmental needs;
[r]elationship between birth parent and relative; [flamily dynamics
in kinship home related to abuse or neglect of the child; [p]resence
of substance abuse; [w]illingness to cooperate with the agency;
[e]xisting support systems; [niumber of children in the home and
their status (e.g., HIV or other medical conditions, drug use);
[h]ealth status of kinship caretakers; [a]ge of kinship caretakers in
light of the child's long-term needs; and [t]he possibility that family
members will pressure the child to recant any allegations of abuse.'
These factors can aid an agency in the determination of whether a
particular kinship placement is appropriate.
Kinship foster care has both positive and negative aspects. On the
one hand family preservation is a societal good and remaining with
relatives is easier on the child. These arrangements, however, are
often under-subsidized and poorly monitored. This raises the
question of the appropriate level of governmental involvement in
kinship care. The next part will examine whether kinship foster
parents and their foster children have a constitutionally protected
right to family association.
II. THE LIBERTY INTEREST
In Rodriguez v. McLoughlin,' the Second Circuit found that a
stranger foster family did not have a protected family privacy
interest.' In this case the foster child, Andrew, lived with the foster
parent, Sylvia Rodriguez, from the age of thirteen days. 7 He was
removed at age four.' Rodriguez had previously signed an agreement
indicating her intent to adopt himY9 She disputed the child's removal
from her home, alleging she did not have an adequate opportunity to
be heard before the removal and attacking the denial of visitation
rights in the period before Andrew was returned to her. The court
found that Rodriguez did not have a protected interest when the child
was removed.9 However, the court stated that the discussion applied
84. Davis & Chiancone, supra note 13, at 104.
85. 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000).
86. Id
87. Id. at 331.
88. Id. at 331-32.
89. Id. at 331.
90. Id. at 337.
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to a "biologically unrelated foster family."'" Therefore, this decision
did not foreclose the possible liberty interests of kinship foster parents
and their foster children. The emphasis in Rodriguez and other cases9l
on the lack of a biological relationship in foster families implies that a
foster family who is biologically related may have a protectable
interest.
This part will discuss the possible liberty interest at stake for kinship
foster parents and the children in their care. It will begin with a
discussion of family and parental rights in general.93 Next, it will
examine the rights of stranger foster parents. Finally, this part will
address the rights of kinship foster parents and their foster children.94
A. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that a state will not deprive "any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." 95 It has two dimensions-procedural and
substantive.96 Procedural due process refers to the methods used to
protect rights, not to the rights themselves.' The requirements to
prove a violation are that "(1) you were deprived of a 'liberty' or
'property' interest; (2) the [government] intended to deprive you of
your liberty or property interest; and (3) that you were deprived of a
liberty or property interest 'without due process of law.' 9
8
"Substantive due process protects you against random and unfair
deprivations of fundamental rights, including liberty, by state
officials."9 9 In Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, the Supreme
Court found that there was a constitutional right to use
contraception.1"' Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas based his
finding on a right to privacy running throughout the Constitution.',
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan stated that the test to determine if a
right is fundamental is whether that right is "implicit in our concept of
ordered liberty" as evidenced by our history and traditions."° If a
right is fundamental, the government action must pass a strict scrutiny
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See infra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part II.A.
94. See infra Part II.E.
95. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
96. Excerpts from A Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual (5th ed.), in 31 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 305,319 (2000) [hereinafter Lawyer's Manual].
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
99. Id. at 319.
100. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
101. Id. at 482-86.
102. Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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test."°3 If it is not a fundamental right, the government action must be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest."'
Modem substantive due process has evolved. The case law has
recognized other spheres of life, besides contraception, into which the
government may not intrude. There is a fundamental right to an
abortion'0 5 and to marry,' °6 among others. As Moore v. City of East
Cleveland"0 7 displays by granting an extended family the right to live
together, family privacy has been held to be a fundamental right, and,
therefore, is accorded strict scrutiny analysis.1us
B. Parental Rights and Family Privacy: A Constitutional
Background
To assert a liberty interest, one must first determine that there is, in
fact, a constitutional right at stake." A court will then examine the
procedures in place to protect that right."0  The adequacy or
inadequacy of the procedures will determine whether a violation has
occurred."' Parents' liberty interest in their children is one of the
oldest rights recognized in the American tradition of substantive due
process.12 The theme of family privacy runs throughout the Supreme
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
104. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
105. See id. at 164.
106. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,386 (1978).
107. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
108. But see David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 Vand. L Rev.
527, 528 (2000). Meyer suggests that while the Supreme Court purports to use a
fundamental rights analysis when dealing with issues of family privacy, it is actually
using a more flexible framework. Formalizing this lesser standard would embrace a
broader range of families and accord more protection to "non-traditional"
relationships.
109. Harley ex reL Johnson v. City of New York, 36 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
110. Id
111. Id.; see also supra Part II.A. (discussing due process).
112. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (finding the use of the "fair preponderance" standard violative of
parental rights in termination proceedings); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979)(finding constitutional Georgia's procedures for admission of children to mental
hospitals and stating that parents "retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the
decision [to commit the child]" and that parents "retain plenary authority to seek such
care for their children, subject to a physician's independent examination and medicaljudgment"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249, 256 (1978) (finding no violation of
natural father's rights where he had not acted as a parent for eleven years and custody
was granted to stepfather); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (finding it
unconstitutional to require Amish parents to send their children to public school past
a certain age); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1972) (finding an unwed father
was entitled to hearing on his parental fitness after the death of children's natural
mother); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (finding it acceptable for a
guardian to bring her niece to proselytize with her): Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a statute requiring public school attendance to the
exclusion of private school instruction); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)
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Court's jurisprudence. In Meyer v. Nebraska,1 3 the Court first
recognized parental rights."4  The Court found that a statute
prohibiting the teaching of any language but English in public schools
invaded the rights of parents to raise their children.1 5 This ruling
affirmed that freedom under the Fourteenth Amendment means more
than just unconstrained bodily movement. The Court held that
allowing the statute to stand would violate parents' substantive due
process rights in their children.' 6
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"7  Amish parents challenged the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that required public school
attendance until the age of sixteen."' The Court ruled for the parents
under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.119 The Court
stated that the "history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition. 1 20
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters12 1 the Court continued
this theme and ruled that a state could not mandate that children
attend public school instead of private school.1" To do so would
"unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."' 23 The Court further noted that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.1 24 Likewise, the court in Prince v.
Massachusetts recognized a parental right over a child's non-
(finding a statute disallowing instruction in any language other than English to be an
unconstitutional invasion of parental rights).
113. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
114. Id. at 399.
115. Id. at 401 ("Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which
conflict with the Constitution .....
116. Id. at 402.
117. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
118. Id. at 207.
119. Id. at 234.
120. Id. at 232.
121. 268 U.S. 510.
122. Id. at 534-35.
123. Id. at 534-35 (emphasis added). Note that this quote includes the rights of
guardians and the rights of parents. While the Court may not have been equating the
two, it does seem to recognize here that guardians have some sort of family privacy
right in relation to the children they care for, but query the economic factor.
Guardians generally take financial responsibility for the child whereas kinship foster
parents receive a subsidy. Economics definitely enters this debate. See Courtney
supra note 62.
124. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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educational activities, finding it acceptable for an aunt acting as her
niece's guardian to allow the child to accompany her while she was
proselytizing. 2'
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on parental fights
was made in the grandparent visitation case of Troxel v. Granville."6
Petitioners' son, Brad Troxel, had two children with Tommie
Granville. 27 After the couple separated, the Troxels continued to see
their granddaughters when their son brought the girls to their home
on regular visits."2 Brad committed suicide in May 1993 and, though
the visits continued regularly at first, in October 1993 Granville
notified the Troxels that she would limit the visitation to once a
month.129 Under a Washington state statute permitting anyone to
petition for visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best
interest of the child" petitioners requested to visit their
grandchildren. 30 The children's mother opposed their request of two
weekends of visitation every month and two weeks of visitation each
summer.13 1 The Court held that the Washington statute violated the
mother's due process fights to "make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of her two daughters."'" Justice O'Connor,
writing for the plurality, noted that the liberty interest of parents in
the upbringing of their children is one of the oldest interests
recognized by the Supreme Court.133
The contours of this liberty interest, however, are not easily
defined. The interaction between the parent, the child and the state in
family law creates competing interests. In the early cases of Pierce
and Meyers, the rights were framed in terms of parental rights versus
state power. 3' This is not, however, the only relevant relationship
recognized. One jurist framed the rights in terms of parental rights
versus children's rights. A parental right is "a dwindling right which
the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, the
125. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1994) (finding it acceptable for
a child to proselytize with her guardian in keeping with their faith as Jehovah's
Witnesses). Notice again that the Court is recognizing a right for a guardian. The
child in question was being raised by her aunt who was found to have a
constitutionally protected interest in controlling her upbringing.
126. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
127. Id. at 60.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 60-61.
130. Id. at 61.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 72.
133. Id. at 65. But see id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (-Some pre-existing
relationships, then, serve to identify persons who have a strong attachment to the
child with the concomitant motivation to act in a responsible way to ensure the child's
welfare.").
134. David DeGroot, The Liberal Tradition and the Constitution: Developing a
Coherent Jurisprudence of Parental Rights, 78 Tex. L Rev. 1287, 88 (2000).
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older he is."'135 Traditionally, however, the law has concentrated on
duties children owed to their parents with respect to the assignment of
rights in the parent-child relationship. This was due to a sentiment
that parental rights arose from nature.1 36  Modern law no longer
retains this emphasis, but instead centers on child welfare in relation
to parental rights. 37
C. The Full Analysis: Privacy as a Family Right and Not Just an
Individual Entitlement
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is, in fact, such a
thing as a "right to family privacy. "138 This doctrine "recognizes a
parent's fundamental right to the care, custody and companionship of
her or his child as well as the right to make decisions affecting the
welfare of the child free from government interference, except in
compelling circumstances.- 3 9 These rights were defined using the
traditional substantive due process standard, described in Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Griswold, as rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" as evidenced by our traditions.4 Although it has
couched this right in terms of the individual, the Court has extended
this interest beyond the nuclear family to the extended family.' 4'
The separation between what the state can intrude upon and what is
inviolable indicates when it is appropriate to characterize a right as
fundamental, whether parental rights are fundamental, and what the
breadth of those rights are.142 Query who holds these rights and
whose interests should be the focus of this analysis. There are many
peoples' rights at issue in a privacy analysis. A concentration on
parental rights exclusively would deny the child any power in
determining his or her own future.1 43  One commentator has noted
that "[r]ather than seeking to provide adults for children who need
135. Bernard M. Dickens, The Modern Function and Limits of Parental Rights, in
Child Law 167 (Harry D. Krause ed., 1992) (quoting Lord Denning M.R.).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 168.
138. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925). The need for family
privacy is not just a legal interest, but a policy one as well. For the most part the
parent-child relationship should exist free from state intervention and, if state
intervention is ever justified, the child's well-being must govern. Goldstein et al.,
Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 4-5.
139. Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 Alb. L. Rev.
405, 406 (1988) (concentrating on sexual privacy issues and family rights).
140. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1965) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
141. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (striking down a
zoning ordinance that would prohibit certain family members from living in the same
home based on degree of relation).
142. Francis Berry McCarthy, The Confised Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 975, 980 (1988).
143. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1001 (1992).
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them., [current law] seems intent on securing children for adults who
claim them."'" Even if not expressly acknowledged, children have
some rights.
The breadth of the parental liberty interest is therefore limited by
the interests of the child and, by extension, the state acting in the
interests of the child. The state has authority to mandate compulsory
education, intervene in neglect situations and regulate child labor, to
name a few areas."5 It follows that parents are not the final arbiters in
every aspect of their child's life. The balancing of the many interests
involved is only one aspect of the full analysis. Whatever formulation
one chooses and however one interprets these relationships, our legal
system is built upon the idea that these rights are held by adult
individuals."4 Children's rights and legal interests are not part of this
traditional formulation.
A related dialogue centers around redefining what it means to be a
"parent." The title can transcend biological connotations and
embrace a wider variety of relationships.'47 For example, one
commentator has suggested that parenthood could be viewed as
"[r]esponsibility [w]ithin [r]elationship."'4 s This type of analysis is
based on the particular relationships in question.'49 The "responsible
person" would not only attend to his defined roles, but would also pay
attention to the desired outcome in a certain situation.""
"Responsibility, in other words, is a self-enlarging, open-ended
commitment on behalf of another."' 5 ' This reasoning broadens the
definition of who is a parent by demonstrating that a parent is one
who is concerned about what happens to the child in his care. 52
Parenthood is not just an accident of biology.' 5' Another
commentator has suggested a broad view of family rooted in ties of
intimacy."5 These types of expansive definitions of what it means to
144. Mangold, supra note 9, at 839-40 (2000) (citing Woodhouse, supra note 1, at
1812).
145. McCarthy, supra note 142, at 977-78.
146. Pamela Scheininger, Legal Separateness, Private Connectedness: An
Impediment to Gender Equality in the Family, 31 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 283, 283
(1998).
147. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
148. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale LJ. 293,298 (1988).
149. Id. at 299.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Obviously this is an extremely subjective standard but it often seems difficult
to avoid such subjectivity in the family law context.
153. Parental rights are not purely rooted in marriage, either. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (finding that an unmarried natural father, who lost custody of his
children under an Illinois law mandating that children of unwed fathers become wards
of the state at their mothers' death, was entitled to a custody hearing).
154. Susan L. Brooks, The Case for Adoption Alternatives, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 43, 47
(2001) (citing Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal Custody
Decision Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 1 (1997)
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be a "parent" allow the recognition of non-traditional parent-child
bonds.155
D. The Rights of Non-Kinship or Stranger Foster Parents
It is well-settled in Supreme Court jurisprudence that natural
parents have a constitutionally protected right to family privacy. 56
This includes the right to decide how children are raised and the kind
of education they should receive. 157 These cases all have a common
thread -biological relationships. 5 8  Several cases, however, have
examined the rights of other kinds of caregivers.
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform
("OFFER"),59 an organization of foster families and individual foster
parents brought an action contesting the pre-removal features of New
York state law, contending that the procedures violated their
procedural due process rights.' 60 Because the agency that places the
child with the foster parents technically retains custody of the child, it
retains the right to remove him from the home for various reasons. 6
While the Supreme Court recognized that "traditional" families have
a due process right to family association, the Court distinguished the
foster family based on three factors: the lack of a blood
relationship, 62 the origin of foster families in state and contract law, 163
and the tension between protecting the liberty interests of the natural
parents while also extending familial rights to foster parents.,' 6
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Brennan queried whether "the
relation of foster parent to foster child [is] sufficiently akin to the
concept of 'family' recognized in our precedents to merit similar
protection [to that of natural families]?"1 65
The Court, in deciding that the pre-removal procedures' 66 were
sufficient to protect any "interests" that may exist, distinguished
(describing and applying family systems theory)); see also, Waldfogel, supra note 24,
at 111 (noting that extended families may even be resources to provide support to
parents that could help to prevent abuse and neglect at the outset).
155. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit also offer an expansive definition of parent:
"Parents are Adults who have the right and responsibility, in law, to make decisions
for their Child.... Longtime Caretakers are presumed to be Parents." Goldstein et
al., Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 188-89.
156. Supra note 112 and accompanying text. However, it is important to note that
this family privacy right has emerged in a piecemeal fashion and it is difficult to point
to a standard set of rights. Meyer, supra note 108, at 528.
157. Meyer, supra note 108, at 528.
158. See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
159. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 829.
162. Id. at 843.
163. Id. at 845-46.
164. Id. at 846.
165. Id. at 842.
166. The pre-removal review process called for the following features:
[Vol. 70
WHEN GRANDMA BECOMES MOM
between a foster family and a natural family." It did not, however,
address the question of what the exact "interests" were. In addition, it
did not pinpoint the legal boundaries of what constitutes a "family"
for purposes of the fights analysis. While the Court acknowledged
that it is more than biology that defines a family, it stressed the
difference between the blood relationship, which is founded in nature,
and the foster family relationship, which is founded in state contract
law.1" This does not mean, however, that foster parents are
completely without rights with regard to their foster children. It
simply means that whatever rights they do have were sufficiently
protected by the pre-removal procedures that were in place.'1 While
some courts have used OFFER to protect a "very long term foster
relationship," it has usually been relied on to deny any rights to foster
parents.170
This is not to say that foster parents are completely devoid of legal
rights and remedies. Foster parents have legal standing to assert
whatever liberty interest they may have in their foster families. 7 1
Some states give foster parents a right to notice and a pre-removal
hearing.172 Foster parents may also have the additional right to
(1) the review is heard before a supervisory official who has had no previous
involvement with the decision to remove the child; (2) both the foster
parents and the agency may be represented by counsel and each may present
witnesses and evidence; (3) all witnesses must be sworn, unless stipulated
otherwise, and all testimony is subject to cross-examination; (4) counsel for
the foster parents must be allowed to examine any portion of the agency's
files used to support the proposal to remove the child; (5) either a tape
recording or stenographic record of the hearing must be kept and made
available to the parties at cost; and (6) a written decision, supported by
reasons, must be rendered within five days and must include a reminder to
the foster parents that they may still request a post-removal hearing under
N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14.
Id. at 849 n.56 (quoting Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform v. Dumpson,
418 F.Supp. 277,285 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
167. Id- at 847-850.
168. Id. at 843-46.
169. Id. at 855.
170. David L. Chambers and Michael S. Wald commented:
States that did not afford foster parents any pre-removal conferences or
hearings were put on notice that their process might be unconstitutional....
The OFFER decision has been cited by a few courts as a basis for protecting
a very long-term foster relationship, although most of the ten to fifteen
published opinions that have cited the case, for more than a passing
reference in a string citation, have used it to deny foster parents any rights.
David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, "Smith v. OFFER" in In the Interest of
Children 114-117, reprinted in Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 37. at 542.
171. 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 77 (1987).
172. Mark Hardin & Josephine Bulkley, The Rights of Foster Parents to Challenge
Removal and to Seek Adoption of Their Foster Children, in The Rights of Foster
Parents 17 (1989); see also Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Cal. 1985) (finding that foster parents are entitled to procedural due process in
relation to a pre-removal hearing); Christina K. v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. Rptr. 564
(1986) (finding that when foster parents are de facto parents they have standing in
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intervene in proceedings to terminate parental rights.'73 The message
seems to be that whatever fights foster parents may have, there are
procedural safeguards in place to protect them.174
Consider, however, the Fifth Circuit case of Drummond v. Fulton
County Department of Family & Children's Services.175  The court
balanced the competing interests of the state and foster parents, but
found that the adoption agency had struck an acceptable
compromise. 76 This case involved a biracial child who was placed
with white parents for temporary foster care at the age of one
month.'77 Within one year the foster parents requested to adopt him
and the state denied their request. The foster parents asserted that
they had formed a "psychological family" with the child, and that
while he lived with them, "mutual feelings of love and dependence
developed which are analogous to those found in most biological
families.' ' 7 8 However, the court rejected this argument, finding that a
relationship based in state law could not be equated with one founded
in biology. 79 Drummond is just one example, but this and other state
and federal courts have sent the message that stranger foster parents
do not have a liberty interest in their foster families.'
E. The Rights of Kinship Foster Parents
The right to family privacy in general and family association in
particular has been extended beyond the nuclear family. In Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, for example, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional an ordinance making it a crime for a family consisting
hearings); In re C.O.W., 519 A.2d 711 (D.C. App. 1987) (holding that a statute
allowing a comparison between a child's natural and foster parents does not violate
due process); In re Michael W., 508 N.Y.S.2d 124 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that when
a child is living in a foster home and a petition to terminate an order of placement is
filed, the foster parents may participate in the proceedings).
173. See, e.g., In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178 (1980) (finding long-term foster parents
had right to intervene in hearing to terminate parental rights). But see Webster v.
Ryan, 187 Misc. 2d 127 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001) (finding stranger foster parent did not
have a right to intervene in hearing to determine parental fitness); In re Kimberly J.,
595 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div. 1993) (finding foster parents did not have right to
intervene in termination of parental rights hearings).
174. See e.g., note 169 and accompanying text.
175. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
176. Id. at 1210-11.
177. Id. at 1203.
178. Id. at 1206.
179. Id. at 1206. Furthermore, as in OFFER, the court found that even if there
had, arguendo, been an interest, the Georgia state procedures provided sufficient
protection. Id.
180. Cf Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979)
(finding that foster parents and child were not entitled to due process protections
before removal); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (finding
acceptable the procedure to revoke a foster home license in Michigan). However,
stranger foster parents are not completely devoid of any rights in relation to their
foster children. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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of a grandmother, her son and grandson, and an additional grandson
to live together."' It is not, then, only so-called "traditional" families
that are accorded constitutional protections. "Kinship" foster parents
and their foster children appear to fit into the non-traditional
conception of family."
Unfortunately, it is still unclear what definitely falls into the
protected family privacy realm. "[T]he Court has been content to let
strands of doctrine emerge piecemeal. ''' In fact, the holdings of
Pierce'14 and Meyer'81 are currently viewed by many as based on
rationales other than due process.86 This confused tradition of
substantive due process rights in the family privacy area makes it
difficult to formulate one coherent standard.
A Second Circuit case, Rivera v. Marcus,'" provides yet another
interpretation of these due process interests and an interesting
comparison with OFFER and Rodriguez. The Rivera court found that
a half sister had due process rights in relation to her half brother and
sister for whom she was a foster parent.' The court noted that the
OFFER Court had left open the possibility that "long term" foster
parents may have certain protections due to the family ties and
relationships that develop.'" In Rivera,' Betty Jean Ross and her two
children moved in with Rivera in 1968.91 Rivera was a blood relation
because she had the same biological father as the two children.,'
During this time, they lived together as a family and she acted as a
"surrogate mother" due to Ross's psychological issues.93 When Ross
was committed to a mental institution, Rivera became the children's
foster parent."9 The children were removed in 1974.191 During the
time they were not in her care, Rivera was not able to talk to her half
brother and sister or to learn their whereabouts.' In determining
Rivera's due process interest, the court noted that such interests are
not limited by the text of the Constitution."9 The court then stated
181. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
182. Or perhaps the lesson is that there is no "model" for what defines a family!
183. Meyer, supra note 108, at 528.
184. For a discussion of Pierce, see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of Meyer, see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
186. Meyer, supra note 108, at 534 (stating that these holdings may have been
based on the First Amendment idea that "the State may not ... contract the spectrum
of available knowledge" or that they may have been aimed at protecting minorities).
187. 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982).
188. Id
189. Id at 1024.
190. 696 F.2d 1016 (1982).
191. Id. at 1017.
192. Id. at 1018.
193. Id
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1021.
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that "[t]he constitutional conception of 'family' has evolved ... to
include relationships among members of what has commonly become
known as the 'extended family.' 19 I It then noted the significance of
biological connections in extending the constitutional protections for
parent and child to other types of bonds. 99 The court distinguished
Rivera from those cases in other circuits denying such a right for other
foster parents on the basis of biological relationship.2 0° Rivera was
found to possess a liberty interest in her association with her half
brother and sister.20'
One may ask why, post-Rivera, an analysis of the liberty interests of
kinship foster parents is necessary. While Rivera appears to grant a
liberty interest to kinship foster parents, it has little subsequent
history.202 Indeed, it has rarely even been cited.203 Kinship foster
parents are not lining up in front of family court to vindicate their
rights and keep their families intact. Why is this? One possible
answer is that the facts of Rivera entail an extremely intense kind of
kinship relationship. One child came to live with Rivera during
infancy and the other was born while his natural mother resided in her
home.21  The natural mother lived with all three as a family until she
was committed to a mental institution. 5 In fact, she asked Rivera to
become the primary caregiver.0 6 While it is certainly possible that
other families are in this situation, these facts display the kinship
foster mother acting as a primary caregiver almost from the time of
the children's birth. The opinion is broad, however, in the sense that
while it discusses biological ties as determinative, there are no
standards set.207 It does not limit the type of relationship or biological
tie that must exist or set out an analytical framework to determine
what type of relationship is enough.
198. Id. at 1022.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding,
post-Rivera, that stranger foster parents do not have a liberty interest); Kyees v.
County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); Drummond
v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir.
1977) ("[The foster family] has never been recognized as equivalent to either the
natural family or the adoptive family by any court. ); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F.
Supp. 728 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that foster parent had no liberty interest
protected by due process).
201. Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1025.
202. See Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing Rivera); In re A.W.R., 17 P.3d 192 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied,
2001 Colo. LEXIS 52 (Jan. 22,2001) (declining to follow Rivera).
203. See Whalen, 126 F.3d at 405 (distinguishing Rivera); In re A.W.R., 17 P.3d at
196, (declining to follow Rivera).
204. Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1017.
205. Id. at 1018.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1022.
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Perhaps kinship foster parents just are not challenging these
decisions. The problem may be self-correcting in that where the facts
are as strong as they were in Rivera, caseworkers are less likely to
remove the children. Another explanation, however, is a lack of legal
services.' Foster parents may not be entitled to representation in
removal situations and there are few alternatives for those who want
to contest a removal but do not have the resources to hire an
attorney.' Additionally, there are not even that many requests for
pre-removal hearings.210 In fact, one objection to extending a liberty
interest to kinship foster parents is that there may be a huge backlog
of cases when these kin start asserting their rights.
Possibly, there is a lack of requests because removals usually occur
in an acceptable manner due to agencies adhering to state
regulations.211 The answer may also be that foster parents simply do
not think they have any chance at the hearing so they do not even
bother to request one.212 Many foster parents may not be aware that
they even have a right to a hearing.
Another factor limiting the precedential value of Rivera is that the
procedures at issue in that case offered much less protection than did
the procedures in Rodriguez. 3 In Rodriguez, the Second Circuit
found that a biologically unrelated foster mother's rights were not
violated by the removal of her foster child.21'4  However, when
defective procedures "create a potential for erroneous deprivation [of
a constitutional right]" it is easier to find a violation.21 If there were a
definitive liberty interest, there would be a much higher bar for the
procedures in question because state action would be subject to strict
scrutiny instead of rational relationship analysis. Rivera is still good
law in the Second Circuit, but it has not been challenged and it is
20& See e.g., 18 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18 § 443.5 (2001) (granting foster
parents procedural rights including the ight to appear with a lawyer, but declining to
direct the court to provide one free of charge).
209. See id. Natural parents may be entitled to an attorney when their children are
removed. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 261 ("Persons involved in certain family court
proceedings may face the infringements of fundamental interests and rights, including
the loss of a child's society... and therefore have a constitutional right to counsel in
such proceedings.")
210. Chambers & Wald, supra note 170, at 543.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Under the Connecticut regulations at issue in Rivera, the foster parent could
not bring an attorney to the hearing or participate in any meaningful way. In fact, he
or she could not be present in the courtroom except as a testifying witness.
Additionally, no written opinion was required and the decision could not be appealed.
Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1027-28. The New York procedures in Rodriguez permitted foster
parents to intervene in custody proceedings and to petition for adoption, and gave
preference to foster parents in adoption proceedings. Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214
F.3d 328,340 (2d Cir. 2000).
214. Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000).
215. Rivera. 696 F.2d at 1027.
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unclear whether or not it could withstand such a challenge. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether or not kinship foster
parents should be accorded family privacy rights.
In Rivera, the due process interest asserted was based on the
Constitution. A due process interest may also, however, arise from
the laws of the states.1 6 For an interest to arise under a statute or
regulation, the language in question must create more than a
"unilateral hope '21 7 and must be more than an "abstract need or
desire. "218 Basically, there is a protected liberty interest where a
"State... place[s] substantive limitations on official discretion. '219 A
state could do this through any number of foster care regulations. For
example, it could give an automatic option to adopt to kin after a
certain amount of time passes. This means that there are predicates to
govern what is decided and that certain scenarios mandate prescribed
results.22 In this way an expectation is created and, consequently, an
interest. However, this has not been a successful argument in cases
asserting the rights of foster parents.22'
In his concurrence in Rivera, Judge Kaufman noted that children's
rights were implicated by the decision and that it was not just about
parental rights.2" As the next part argues, a good step would be an
expansion of the right recognized in Rivera to embrace the children's
right dimension. As discussed earlier, any recognition of a liberty
interest for a kinship foster parent is really the recognition of a family
216. Ky. Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460,466 (1983)).
217. Id. (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981)).
There must be a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the right, not just a flimsy wish
that the right exists. Id.
218. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). A party cannot
just expect to receive the right, but must have a "legitimate claim" to it. Roth, 480
U.S. at 577.
219. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249
(1983)).
220. Id.
221. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846,
849 (1977) (stating that state laws demonstrate the legal expectations of the parties
and that the procedures set up by the state in this case were sufficient); Rodriquez v.
McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that a liberty interest
may arise from state law, but finding no such liberty interest); Rivera v. Marcus, 696
F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding a liberty interest based on the familial
relationship and not on expectations founded in state law).
222. Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1029 (Kaufman, J. concurring). Kaufman remarked:
It is beyond peradventure that the nuclear family is not the only
constitutionally protected family unit.... [I]t has become a commonplace to
encounter families whose members include stepparents, half-brothers and -
sisters, aunts and uncles and others.... [T]he emotional ties which bind
such families are no less significant or deep than those which exist within the
traditional nuclear structure. [I want to] emphasize that the constitutional
rights of children are directly and vitally implicated in custody termination
proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added).
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right.' It cannot be held by the individual alone, but must take into
account the interests of all who are involved. This balance must
include the interests of the child. The next part will argue that,
considering such a balance, kinship foster parents have a liberty
interest in their foster families.
III. KINSHIP FOSTER PARENTS HAVE A LIBERTY INTEREST IN THEIR
FOSTER FAMILIES
This part will argue that, as the Rivera court found, kinship foster
parents have a liberty interest in their foster families. This will
proceed under both a constitutional and policy analysis. As John Hart
Ely remarked, "'[i]t remains to ask the hardest questions. Which
values, among adequately neutral and general ones, qualify as
sufficiently important or fundamental or whathaveyou [sic] to be
vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by legislative
acts? And how is the Court to evolve and apply them?"' 4 Do we, as
a society, place enough importance on the extended family for it to
qualify for a right of association? This part will begin with a
discussion of the need to view tradition and family broadly. It will
then suggest that, in defining family privacy rights, the analysis should
focus on the relationships between people and not just on individual
status. Next, the argument will focus on the need to alter the view
that adoption is the best way to provide a child with permanency.
Finally, this part will argue that there should be a rebuttable
presumption that kinship foster parents have rights akin to those of
natural parents.
A. American Society Has Many Traditions and Models of "Family"'
Liberty interests are not just pulled from the Constitution but they
reflect our communal values and traditions. The right cannot be
evaluated in a vacuum, but must be examined in relation to what it
would add to a "society of ordered liberty."' The formal recognition
in both law and theory of familial relationships outside the immediate
family is a natural extension of the Supreme Court's recognition of
constitutional protections for family units other than the "traditional"
family.26 It is not simply mother, father, children and cocker spaniel
223. See supra Part II.C.
224. John Hart Ely, Foreword- On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L
Rev. 5 (1978) (quoting Alexander Bickel).
225. DeGroot, supra note 134, at 1289. Justice Harlan described the standard for a
liberty interest as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as evidenced by our
traditions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479.500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
226. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (noting
that "the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children-and
its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns").
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that is protected as a unit because it is "implicit in [our] concept of
ordered liberty." 7 Other formulations of the family unit have been
recognized and protected.' Justice Powell expressed these values
clearly in the majority opinion in Moore: 9 "Ours is by no means a
tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has
roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition."130
The Court, however, often refers to the idea of "traditional" society
when it rules that a particular family relationship is not protected? -
Yet, even more than when Powell wrote for the majority in Moore, in
today's society it is difficult to point to a single model of family.?32
Approximately twenty-seven percent of families with children under
the age of eighteen are single-parent households, just under twenty-
five percent of children reside in or will reside in step-families during
their childhood, and almost four million children live with their
grandparents. 233
Using tradition as a source of fundamental rights can be
problematic for other reasons as well. First, this approach could make
rights analysis a static area of legal thought. This would chill the
development of the law. Any relationship that is "non-traditional"
would be unprotected. Second, it raises the issue of whose or what
traditions are determinative. 5  In the United States where many
different cultures coexist, it is difficult to define a singular norm.
Many traditions have histories of caring for relatives' children in
times of need. For example, "[p]arenting by kin has historically been
227. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
228. See e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 506 (finding unconstitutional a zoning ordinance
that would disallow a grandson from residing with his grandmother).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 504; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) ("The
demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family.").
231. Meyer, supra note 108, at 562-63; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 123 (1989) (stating that parental rights case law is based on "the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to
the relationships that develop within the unitary family").
232. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
233. Kimberly R. Willoughby & Sherilyn Rogers, Legal Protection of Children in
Nontraditional Families, 29 Colo. Law. 79, 79 (2000) (raising the additional issue of
biological engineering as further confusing the idea of what a family will be in the
future). But consider this-isn't this all a moot discussion because haven't
grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc. been caring for children in their families in times of
need for the whole of human history? Perhaps a kinship foster home is a
"traditional" family after all.
234. McCarthy, supra note 142, at 984.
235. Id.
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a survival strategy used by many African American families."'  This
cultural reality may explain why families in the African American
community often use kinship care. 7 "Many Latino and Asian
families involve grandparents, godparents, and others in the care of
children and in decision making and planning in [sic] behalf of these
children."' These and many other traditions are part of American
society and must be considered in the analysis. In order to be
"culturally competent," the child welfare system should be a complex
of "'systems, agencies, and practitioners that have the capacity, skills,
and knowledge to respond to the unique needs of populations whose
cultures are different than that which might be called dominant or
mainstream American." '' 9  A step in this direction would be to
explore the possibilities of concurrent adoption and subsidized
guardianship in the jurisdictions that have these options.2' 0 This
would recognize the importance of the extended family in the African
American community, which represents a large percentage of kinship
foster families.241
Cultural differences are especially important in family law because
of the vague "best interest of the child 24 2 standard that is the current
test for many child welfare proceedings. When used at the placement
stage, this standard does not provide much guidance as to where
decision makers should look to determine who or what will be in any
one child's best interest.243
236. Leslie, supra note 44, at 331; see also Outcome & Performance Indicators:
New York City Administration for Children's Services 81 (June 1998), available at
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.usIhtml/acs/pdf/rpindrep.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). This
chart indicates that in 1997 seventy-one percent of the foster care population in New
York City was black, twenty-four percent was Hispanic, three percent was white, and
two percent was other. Id. These statistics demonstrate why different cultural
backgrounds must be considered in foster care policies.
237. Leslie, supra note 44, at 331.
238. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 802.
239. Brooks, supra note 154, at 48 (citing Lori Klein, Doing What's Right:
Providing Culturally Competent Reunification Services, 12 Berkeley Women's L.J. 20
(1997) (quoting Terry Cross)).
240. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
241. See Brooks, supra note 154, at 49.
242. It has been theorized that the "best interests" standard is unworkable because
it does not provide a predictable standard for what the best interests will be. "A
judge would need masses of information pertaining to each child ... as well as the
future homes and communities, to justify substituting his or her judgment for that of
the [custodian] .... [T]he judge is left with vast discretion... lead[ing] to inevitable
appellate deference to trial judges." Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and
Relocation. A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. Louisville J. Fain. L. 1, 42 (1995).
243. "So long as the child is part of a viable family, his own interests are merged
with those of the other members. Only after the family fails in its function should the
child's interests become a matter for state intrusion." Goldstein et al., Before the Best
Interests, supra note 77, at cover page (suggesting that the family should be proven
dysfunctional before the state has any legitimate right to intervene). As long ago as
1888, it was recognized that the child's interests must be the determining factor in
custody decisions. G.W. Field, Parent and Child 64 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981)
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B. The Relationship Between Child and Caregiver Should be
Considered in a Family Privacy Analysis
Despite its shortcomings, the best interest standard is certainly
superior to one that concentrates solely on parental rights, and it is the
prevailing one used in family courts today.24  This standard
demonstrates that a child's interest is being considered in these
proceedings. Other interests could be more heavily weighted. The
parents' interest in maintaining their nuclear family or the
government's interest in cost-effectiveness could be the center of
analysis. This is especially true because three groups of people may
be seen as having such a claim-the biological parents, the state as
parens patriae, and the daily caregivers, whether they be kinship or
stranger foster parents.2 45 When one balances these often conflicting
interests, the importance of the interest as a shared one emerges. Not
only do these adults have interests, the child also has a stake in the
outcome. 46 The very wording of the standard as one in the child's
best interest implies that the child is not a voiceless party.247
The interests in family law, thus, are not only those of the parent
and his or her wants and needs. The choice of which interests to favor
will have a great impact on the child as well. The family privacy cases
are, however, generally framed in terms of the intrusion of the state
into an individual's private affairs, though the issues involved are
(1888).
244. Bartlett, supra note 148, at 302 (noting that the best interests standard
"represents a considerable ideological and rhetorical advancement over child custody
standards that focus on the parents' interests"); see Roger J.R. Levesque,
International Children's Rights Grow Up: Implications for American Jurisprudence
and Domestic Policy, 24 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 193, 240 (1994) (noting the need for a shift
from the view of the family as a private institution so that children's rights are not
viewed just as derivative of parents' rights but are seen as rights children enjoy on
their own). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 100 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the "best interests" standard may be too vague).
245. See Mangold, supra note 9, at 836.
246. See Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Continuity of Residence as Factor in Contest
Between Parent and Nonparent for Custody of Child Who Has Been Residing with
NonParent-Modern Status, 15 A.L.R. 5th 692 (1993). This is an appendix of cases in
which the effect of continuity of residence on a child was considered as a factor in
placement/custody hearings. Kinship foster parents would, presumably, provide
greater continuity than stranger foster parents. But see Child Welfare Revision:
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997), available at 1997 WL 10572021 (quoting Gary
J. Stangler, Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services who states that
many kinship foster parents are unwilling to adopt). However, query if adoption is as
important in the kinship care context (as in the traditional foster care model) where
biological ties already exist. Also, there may be financial reasons why kinship foster
parents prefer not to adopt.
247. This is especially true for older children who are learning values and life skills
that will aid them in their transition to adulthood. Mangold, supra note 9, at 841
(discussing the need, especially for older children, for a varied group of adults to serve
as role models as they enter adulthood).
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usually more than just a struggle for power between the state and the
individual.2' In fact, the entire American legal system is structured to
consider individual rights and does not really make allowances for an
idea such as "family rights" or rights based on "mutual interaction." 249
"Fundamental to this system is the fact that in every legal proceeding,
it attaches responsibility or liability to one individual."'
Perhaps, rather than the traditional emphasis on individual rights in
substantive due process case law, a more useful analysis is an
examination of the relationships between the parties as opposed to
their rights against the state or even each other.2 After all, family
privacy is an area that affects people as groups and not just as
individuals. There are a wide variety of roles and relationships that
can be viewed as parent-child. Therefore, identity in relation to the
child and human relationships in general should inform how we
analyze family privacy rights. 2 A right to family privacy could attach
to a family as an entity, and need not be divided among parents,
children, relatives and whoever else thinks they deserve a piece of the
pie. At least one court has found that "[c]hildren of custodial
relatives.., possess a liberty interest in preserving the stability of
their family, and ... are entitled to due process protections when the
state decides to remove them from the family environment."2
C. Rethinking Permanency
As discussed above, there is an interest in the permanency of a
placement for a child. I Prevailing models define permanency as
adoption or return of the child to his home.2-  This definition has
been reinforced by the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA").2 " ASFA "places great emphasis and financial incentives
248. Meyer, supra note 108, at 552.
249. Brooks, supra note 154, at 47-48.
250. Id. at 48.
251. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Comment, Miller v. Albright: Problems of
Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1148 (1999) (theorizing
that while Supreme Court jurisprudence generally recognizes the individual as right
holder, in family law it may be more effective to examine the parent-child
relationship).
252. See Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1225,
1240-41 (1999).
253. Harley ex rel. Johnson v. City of New York, 36 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding that foster parent had due process rights before foster children were
removed, but the caseworkers still had cause to remove the children). This case raises
the issue of the subjective nature of the caseworker in removal situations. If there is a
due process right, can it ever really be protected if caseworkers can remove children
whenever they decide that there is an emergency? And if they could not, wouldn't
that endanger many children? There is an inherent tension here.
254. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
255. See Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 804.
256. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
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on adoption as the primary avenue to permanency. '257  There are
financial incentives only for adoption and not for other types of
permanency. 8 ASFA may not expressly rule out other permanency
options, but it certainly discourages them.219 This is a direct response
to the perceived failures of the previous legislation, the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA").2 °
Perhaps the goal needs to be redefined. One study defined
permanency as "the child's safe return to live with a family member,
adoption by a relative or non-relative, or transfer of legal
guardianship to a relative or other adult willing to rear the child until
the age of majority. '261  Under this analysis, many kinship foster
parents who are unwilling to adopt may still be able to provide
permanency. Other alternatives to adoption, including subsidized
guardianship," cooperative adoption263 and private guardianship,
should be considered. One study, however, showed that caseworkers
were reluctant to discuss the private guardianship option with kinship
foster parents because they would receive a considerably lower
subsidy.2 4 The same study, however, demonstrated that kinship foster
257. Brooks, supra note 154, at 45; see also, Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in
Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 112, 119 (1999) ("[T]he government's shift toward promoting adoption for
children in foster care fails both in theory and practice to address the child welfare
system's fundamental problem-the placement of too many children in substitute
care.").
258. Brooks, supra note 154, at 45; see also Courtney supra note 62, at 92 (noting
the fear in the child welfare community that "the combination of fixed funding
streams for.., direct services to children and their families, but open-ended federal
support for out-of-home care, creates an incentive for public agencies to place
children in out-of-home care rather than offering services that could keep their
families intact").
259. See Brooks, supra note 154, at 45.
260. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980); David J. Herring, The Adoption and
Safe Families Act-Hope and its Subversion, 34 Fam. L.Q. 329, 330 (2000). AACWA
subordinated other "permanent" outcomes in favor of reunification with biological
parents. Herring, supra, at 330. It focused, overall, on moving children into
permanent homes more quickly. Id. at 332. This emphasis, however, was not
accomplished because while actors in the child welfare system conformed with
AACWA in form, they "failed to comply with AACWA in any substantive way." Id,
at 336. This subverted the goals of permanency for children and led to Congress'
passage of ASFA. Id. at 335.
261. Herring, supra note 260, at 335.
262. Brooks, supra note 154, at 51 ("[Subsidized] [g]uardianship creates a
permanent relationship between guardian and ward, but appointment of a guardian
over a child does not require the formal termination of parental rights, so a
relationship between child and parent can continue.... The subsidy ... allows
potential guardians to give a child a permanent home who could not afford to do so
otherwise.").
263. Id. ("Cooperative adoption refers to an adoption in which the parties agree to
allow some element of continuity between the birth family and the adoptive family.
The continuity may range from exchanging information and photographs to ongoing
contact.").
264. Gleeson et al., supra note 61, at 814.
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parents were not "substantially involved in permanency planning for
the child."'  Perhaps some kinship foster parents would be willing to
pursue other options if they were advised of the different sets of rights
that correspond with each category. They may not even be aware that
these options exist. "[B]asic principles of client self-determination
require that caseworkers present all permanency options to family
members and assist them in making choices, rather than making
decisions for these families wvithout presentation of all options. 2 1'
Continuity of care is not only a legal interest, it also has a large impact
on a child's psychological health.267 Living with the same adults over
time and developing relationships with these caregivers is important
to a child's development.
Permanency can thus mean many different things in the foster care
context.261 It can be just as harmful to a child to break bonds formed
with a foster parent as it can be to sever the ties to a natural or
adoptive one.269 "[T]hese familial bonds need not depend upon the
technicality of the biological.., relationship between a child and an
adult.""27 The ties of kinship would cause these bonds to develop
quickly and to grow very strong. The biological tie between kinship
foster parents and their foster children has been emphasized
throughout the case law.271  The foster parent becomes the
"psychological" parent in the mind of the child and these ties need
and deserve protection .2  This means that the relationship is not
perceived as one of temporary caregiving, but as a permanent parent-
child bond. In these cases, permanency would most effectively be
described as a relative willing to raise the child to the age of majority
(if the caregiver is willing to do so), and adoption should not be
required.
265. Id. at 819.
266. Id. at 821.
267. Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 40 (defining
continuity of care as "an unbroken relationship with at least one adult who is and
wants to be directly responsible for [the child's] daily needs").
268. Berrick, supra note 39, at 77 (noting that that idea of a "permanent home" has
been expanded to include kin).
269. "[Note] the importance of the psychological ties that develop over time
between a child and the adults who continuously provide for his day-to-day care."
Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 40: see also Claire Sandt,
Considering Children's Attachment in Placement Decisions-A Conversation with Dr.
Jay Belsky, in What I Wish I'd Learned In Law School, supra note 13, at 97 (defining
attachment in terms of "ft]he affection and emotional ties that exist between the child
and parent [as they] reflect the extent that the child expects and has confidence his or
her parent will be available and responsive to his or her desires, especially those of an
emotional nature").
270. Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 40.
271. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846,
849 (1977); Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2000); Rivera v. Marcus
696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982).
272. See Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests, supra note 77, at 42.
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Biology is not the only reason, however, that the right should be
granted. Another reason to recognize rights for kinship caregivers is
to encourage potential kinship foster parents to enter into these
arrangements and to take an active role in the placement of their
relatives. In a recent case, two boys, Clarence and Ernest Wright,
were hospitalized after their mother was indicted for assaulting them
and leaving them so bruised and battered that when their father saw
one of his sons, he thought he had been burned in a fire.273 The
former foster parent, a great-aunt, stated that she had warned the
Administration for Children's Services that the boys would be in
danger if returned to their mother. 4 It is unclear whether or not she
requested a hearing or even knew if she had a right to do so. Perhaps
if there had been a hearing the children would have been protected
and other relatives in similar situations would be encouraged to come
forward in times of need. Clearly this is an extreme case and not
every relative will be in a good position to determine what is in a
child's best interests, but this situation certainly could have been
avoided. Relatives may have important input into which placements
are appropriate and should be informed of their rights regarding the
removal of children in their care.
D. Defining Kinship and The Rebuttable Presumption Standard
One issue this discussion raises is how close do the biological ties
need to be for a relationship to qualify as "kin"? For instance, query
the legal standing of a spouse of a blood relation, a fourth cousin or
the family friend who has always been like a second mother to the
child. There are no bright line tests for this, and, thus, it appears that
the analysis must proceed on a case by case basis. State statutes have
kept the definitions broad and do not give much guidance as to what
"kin" is. 75 We are wading into murky waters when we allow courts to
define what relationship is "important" or "close" enough to be
family. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be an alternative.
The Rivera court listed factors to use as a guide to determine the
interests of a foster parent. 76  These are "(1) the biological
relationship between the parties; (2) the expectation of the parties at
the time the relationship was commenced; and (3) the age and
previous living experience of the children prior to entering the foster
273. Nina Bernstein, Loyalty and Distrust of System Keep Abuse Hidden, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 2001, at B1.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1502(t) (1996) (defining kin as "the child's
relative" or "another adult with whom the child or the child's parent already has a
close emotional attachment"); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1017(1) (McKinney 1983 & Supp.
1993) (describing a preference for "a suitable person related to the child with whom
such child may appropriately reside").
276. Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1025.
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care environment."2" The use of these factors would accord the
parties due process because it sets a reasonable standard to use. It
does so, however, while retaining the flexibility needed to act in the
child's best interest. An extension of the Rivera court's analysis
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the right and not simply a
blanket entitlement.
This presumption would give kinship foster parents the same rights
as natural parents and would be rebutted by evidence of abuse,
neglect or other unfitness. This is not an absolute right but a
preference in favor of keeping children with their biological families.
In essence, this is what natural parents have. It is assumed that
natural parents have the right to keep their families together unless
the state deems it necessary to intervene in cases of abuse or neglect.
Kinship foster parents should enjoy the same presumption, but the bar
to rebut it should be lower than that applied to natural parents.
It is socially advantageous to society as a whole to encourage its
citizens to engage in altruistic behavior. -8 No matter what cultural
background we take into account, most would agree that this is a
positive endeavor. What greater good can one do than to help a child
in need? We should encourage families to care for foster children,
especially when they share biological ties with the children in
question. Families who remain strong units can only strengthen a
community and the courts should do their part, consistent with the
Constitution, to support and strengthen the ties that bind.
CONCLUSION
Family privacy is a theme that runs throughout the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court. This group of rights guarantees, among other
things, that parents have the right to control their children's education
and that extended families have the right to live together. When it is
necessary to remove a child and place him into foster care, however,
the concern necessarily shifts to what is in the best interests of the
child. Children deserve continuity and security. In order to guarantee
these necessities to children, kinship foster parents and their foster
children should enjoy a due process right of family association. This is
not a right to be free from interference from the state or from other
277. Id (quoting Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728,739-40 (W.D. Mich. 1980)).
278. As Jill Deurr Berrick commented:
[K]inship caregivers have no absolute obligation to care for their relatives'
children, and the state cannot compel them to rear their relatives. If one of
the goals of public policy is to promote behaviors among citizens that might
not otherwise occur, the development of special services and supports
designed to assist the unique circumstances of kinship caregivers might be
recommended.
Berrick, supra note 39. at 84.
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individuals. It is a right held by the family to stay together as one unit
and is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
